

Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 106168

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FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 3159 ACTION SECSTATE DATED APRIL 24, 1978.

QUOTE: S E C R E T ANKARA 3159

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DEPT PLEASE PASS AS DESIRED TO NICOSIA AND USUN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PEPR, TU, CY, UN

SUBJ: CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 103681

1. SUMMARY: WE REVIEW IN THIS CABLE US OPTIONS FOR
DEALING WITH THE IMPASSE IN CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS. OUR STRONG
RECOMMENDATION IS THAT THE US DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GET
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS GOING AGAIN; NO OTHER OPTION SO CLOSELY
MATCHES US INTERESTS. THIS OBJECTIVE MIGHT BE ADVANCED BY

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MAKING IT CLEAR THAT TALKS WOULD BE HELD ON THE BASIS OF BOTH
THE NEW TURKISH CYPRIOT AND THE OLD GREEK CYPRIOT PROPOSALS.
AS A FALLBACK, OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A WALDHEIM STATEMENT
THAT TALKS ARE IMPOSSIBLE WHILE CONGRESS' DECISION IS PENDING;
THAT STATEMENT COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A US ANNOUNCEMENT THAT
AS SOON AS THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED, CLIFFORD WILL BE MADE
AVAILABLE IF DESIRED TO HELP PREPARE FOR THE TALKS. TWO

IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THE CURRENT CLIMATE ARE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS' BAD PRESS AND THE NEED FOR ECEVIT--CURRENTLY DISTRACTED BY OTHER PROBLEMS--TO RESTORE THE MOMENTUM IN HIS "PEACE OFFENSIVE". WE CAN USEFULLY URGE ACTION ON BOTH AS AN AID TO BREAKING THE IMPASSE. END SUMMARY

2. FOLLOWING ARE OUR VIEWS ON CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS WHILE A CONGRESSIONAL DECISION ON THE EMBARGO IS PENDING:

OPTION A:

PRESS WALDHEIM TO CONVENE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS (EVEN ASSUMING RISK OF KYPRIANOU REJECTION IS REAL).

(1) IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR BEST INTEREST TO GET THE TALKS GOING. THERE IS NO OTHER PRACTICAL ROUTE TO SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AT THIS JUNCTURE.

(2) RESPONDING TO A STRONG US EFFORT IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT FOR LIFTING THE EMBARGO HAS PLAYED A LARGE PART, THE TURKS HAVE PRODUCED SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHICH THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR ARE NEGOTIABLE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TURKS REFRAINED FROM GIVING AWAY THE EXTENT OF THEIR PROSPECTIVE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS--AND THEREBY FORFEITED A CHANCE TO SCORE POINTS IN CONGRESS--PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY ARE SERIOUS IN THEIR INTENT TO NEGOTIATE AND DO NOT
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WANT TO UNDERCUT THEIR POSITION BEFORE THEY GET TO THE TABLE. HAVING MADE THIS EFFORT, AND HAVING WARNED WALDHEIM THAT THEIR PROPOSALS WOULD BE REJECTED BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IN ORDER TO PREVENT REPEAL OF THE EMBARGO, THE TURKS CLEARLY EXPECT THE US TO PRESS WALDHEIM TO GET THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO RESEME TALKS.

(3) THE ALTERNATIVE TO RESUMING TALKS, AS WE POINTED OUT IN ANKARA 3120, IS A HIGH RISK OF A LOST OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. CONTRARY TO THE IMPLICATION OF THE LINE BEING TAKEN BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ("IF THIS IS THE BEST THE TURKS CAN OFFER UNDER THE PRESSURE OF THE EMBARGO, IMAGINE WHAT IT WOULD BE WHEN THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED"), THE CHANCES OF AN IMPROVED TURKISH OFFER WILL BE MUCH LESS, NOT GREATER, IF THE EMBARGO IS RECONFIRMED. WE QUESTION HOW MUCH INTEREST EITHER SIDE WOULD HAVE IN NEGOTIATIONS IF CONGRESS UPHOLDS THE EMBARGO.

OPTION B:

SEEK "SWEETENERS" TO IMPROVE THE TURKISH PROPOSALS.

(1) THE TURKS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WANT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, NOT TO ENGAGE IN ARBITRATION. THEY WOULD BE EXTREMELY RESISTANT TO ANY EFFORT BY THE UN AND ESPECIALLY BY THE US TO IMPROVE THEIR PROPOSALS ON BEHALF OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

(2) THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY AMOUNT OF IMPROVEMENT COULD MAKE THE TURKISH PROPOSALS SWEET ENOUGH FOR KYPRIANOU, ESPECIALLY UNDER THE PRESSURE OF A PENDING CONGRESSIONAL DECISION ON THE EMBARGO. IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS OF 1968-1974, WHEN THE GREEK SIDE WAS DOMINANT, TURKISH PROPOSALS MUCH CLOSER TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION WERE REJECTED.

OPTION C:

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REINTRODUCTION OF GREEK CYPRIOT PROPOSALS.

(1) IF WALDHEIM CALLED UPON THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO PREPARE A NEW PROPOSALS, THE TURKS UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD REGARD IT AS A DELAYING TACTIC.

(2) ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS OPTION COULD BE MADE A VARIANT AMENDMENT OF OPTION A--THAT IS, WALDHEIM COULD PROPOSE THAT TALKS BE HELD ON THE BASIS OF BOTH THE TURKISH PROPOSALS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOT PROPOSALS OF LAST APRIL, WITH THE AIM OF FINDING COMPROMISES. SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD PROBABLY BE GREETED UNHAPPILY BY THE TURKS, BUT THEY WOULD HAVE LITTLE ALTERNATIVE TO ACCEPTING IT. IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ALSO WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN TURNING DOWN TALKS ON SUCH A BASIS.

OPTION D:

SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY.

(1) AS NOTED ABOVE, TURKEY WANTS DIRECT NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, AND WE DOUBT THAT THE GOT WOULD ACCEPT A MEDIATOR.

(2) EVEN IF A MEDIATOR, INFORMAL OR OTHERWISE, WERE ACCEPTED, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY PROCESS COULD MOVE THE SIDES CLOSER AT THIS TIME.

(3) BUT IF THE EMBARGO WERE LIFTED, WE COULD SEE A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR A MEDIATOR TO MOVE THE SITUATION FORWARD (SEE OPTION G).

OPTION E:

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A STATEMENT BY WALDHEIM DECLARING THAT A PROMISING BEGINNING HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS STARTING CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT NO PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE UNTIL CONGRESS HAS RENDERED ITS DECISION ON THE EMBARGO.

(1) ASSUMING THAT WALDHEIM COULD WORD THIS STATEMENT CAREFULLY ENOUGH SO THAT HE WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE INTERFERING IN US INTERNAL AFFAIRS, SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD SEEM TO US THE BEST FALLBACK. IT WOULD BLAME NIETHER THE TURKS NOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FOR THE IMPASSE AND WOULD FOCUS FAIRLY ON THE OVER-RIDING FACT OF OUR CURRENT SITUATION. THE STATEMENT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS.

(2) WE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSION THAT ECEVIT, DESPITE HIS DE-LINKING OF CYPRUS AND THE EMBARGO, WOULD HAVE MUCH INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE IF THE EMBARGO WERE RECONFIRMED. ANY INFLUENCE WE MIGHT HAVE WOULD BE GONE, AND THE PROSPECT WOULD BE ONE OFHA CONTINUATION OT THE PRESENT SITUATION UNTIL IT PASSED BEYOND THE REACH OF ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
OPTION F:

SHIFT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTLING CYPRUS FROM THE UNSYG TO ANOTHER INTERNATIONA BODY OR A GOVERNMENT.

(1) AS SEEN FROM HERE, WALDHEIM'S PERFORMANCE AT VIENNA AND NICOSIA AAS DISAPPOINTING. HE SEEMS UNIMAGINATIVE AND UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO PRESS THE TWO SIDES INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

(2) HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTY OF TAKING THEO PROBLEM AWAY FROM THE UN, UNLESS WALDHEIM AGREES. HIS STATEMENT TO MAYNES THAT IT IS "NOT GOOD FOR THE UN TO GET INTO SOMETHING HOPELESS" MAY SUGGEST WILLINGNESS TO DEFER TO SOMEONE ELSE.

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OPTION G:O

COMBINE THE STATEMENT IN OPTION E (TALKS ARE IMPOSSIBLE PENDING AN EMBARGO DECISION) WITH A FOLLOW-ON US ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AS SOON AS THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO MAKE AVAILABLE THE SERVICES OF

CLARK CLIFFORD, IF DESIRED BY THE PARTIES, TO HELP IN PREPARING FOR TALKS.

(1) THIS WOULD BE A DAMAGE-LIMITING APPROACH, AIMED AT HELPING THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS SURVIVE THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS. IT WOULD EMPHASIZE THE US COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT, AND BY IMPLICATION, WOULD POINT UP THE DIFFICULTY THAT THE EMBARGO PLACES IN THE WAY OF SETTLEMENT.

(2) THE TURKS, AS NOTED PREVIOUSLY, ARE OPPOSED TO MEDIATION. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR THAT CLIFFORD'S ROLE WOULD BE ONE OF SIMPLY ASSISTING IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR TALKS, NOT MEDIATION.

(3) WE ASSUME THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD FIND CLIFFORD ACCEPTABLE, AS THEY DID BEFORE.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST CHOICE IS A COMBINATION OF OPTIONS A AND C--HOLDING TALKS BASED ON PROPOSALS FROM BOTH SIDES. NO OTHER OPTION EVEN APPROACHES IT IN TERMS OF CONGRUITY WITH US INTERESTS. WE THEREFORE STRONGLY URGE THAT THE USG PRESS WALDHEIM TO CALL FOR RESUMPTION OF TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THE TWO SETS OF PROPOSALS NOW IN PLAY. IF RESUMPTION TURNS OUT NOT TO BE POSSIBLE, WE WOULD PREFER OPTIONS
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B. ONE OF THE FACTORS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION SEEMS TO BE THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ARE GETTING A BAD PRESS. WE BELIEVE WE COULD USEFULLY URGE THE TURKS TO STRESS THE NEGOTIABILITY OF THEIR POSITION, EITHER PUBLICLY OR IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH A NUMBER OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. THE BAD PRESS PREVAILS PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO TERRITORY, IN WHICH IT SEEMS TO US THAT AN ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION HAS BEEN CREATED--WITH KYPRIANOU'S HELP--THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSAL DELINEATED AN AREA FOR RETURN TO THE GREEK SIDE WHICH WOULD BE 1 1/2 PER CENT OF THE ISLAND.

C. ALONG THE SAME LINES, WE MIGHT ALSO DRAW ECEVIT'S ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR RESTORING THE MOMENTUM IN HIS "PEACE OFFENSIVE". HE HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN DEEPLY PREOCCUPIED WITH TURKEY'S SEVERE PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMY AND IN PUBLIC SECURITY, BUT NO DOUBT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO RETURN HIS PERSONAL ATTENTION AND DRIVE WHICH SEEMS AN IRREPLACEABLE ELEMENT HERE--TO THIS CRITICAL ISSUE OF FOREIGN POLICY.

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